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Contemporary discussions on the idea of power are directed toward its political?
dimension. Power is understood usually as a feature of governing, premiership,?
ruling et cetera. Pop-cultural visions build upon the idea of endless and unlimited?
political power, as do the popular series: Game of Thrones or House of Cards. Despite?
that, it seems that nowadays we are somehow witnessing the unprecedented?
impoverishment of the discourse of power. A description of a different dimension?
of the idea of power will be presented in this paper. The writings of Augustine of?
Hippo, an ancient Christian philosopher and a Church Father, are treated here as?
an example of one of the most extensive and fruitful representations of that?
alternative idea of power (Latin: potestas, verb: possum, posse), which is rich in?
political, as well as theological and anthropological aspects.
Without fail, Augustine most frequently employed the Latin idea of potestas?in?
the theological context. The aim of his outstanding work – De civitate Dei1?– is to?
argue that the infirmity (lat. impotestas, i.e. the state of being powerless) of the the?
Roman Empire is not caused by the new Christian religion, but rather by the?
unreasonable actions of Romans and their emperors. In particular, in Book IV?
Augustine describes the  as irrational because it has lost justice (remota iustitia).2?
Moreover, he diagnoses the real origin of any political action as well as of any real?
power: reason and its submission to the Christian God as He is depicted in the?
Bible. Therefore, the theological dimension of the idea of power, which builds?
upon anthropological and political aspects, is central in his argumentation. 
Nonetheless, the anthropological considerations are inevitable for his theology:?
without a vision of man, theology would be limited to sheer speculation about?
the divine and would remain empty of analysis concerning human beings and –
in consequence – their political and social world. It is this anthropological
On the City of God, trans. and ed. by P. Schaff, see: on-line: http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf
102.toc.html [11.05.2015]. 
See: De civitate Dei, IV. 9-10. See also De re publica, 2.70.
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For a discussion of voluntaristm and intellecualism, see: Josef Lösll: Intellect with a (Divine) Purpose.
Augustine on the Will. In: The Will and Human Action. From Antiquity to the Present Day, ed. by
Th. Pink / M. W. F. Stone, London / New York: Routledge 2004, pp. 53–77.
See for example: D. Béland: The Idea of Power and the Role of Ideas. In: Political Studies Review 8
(2010), pp. 145–154; R. A. Dahl: The Concept of Power. In: Behavioral Science 2–3 (1957), pp.
201–215; W. H. Riker: Ambiguities in the Notion of Power. In: The American Political Science Review
58-2 (1964), pp. 341–349; M. Foucault: The Subject and Power. In: Critical Inquiry 8–4 (1982),
pp. 777–795. The article by E. H. Harris (The Power of Reason. In: The Review of Metaphysics 22–
4, pp. 621–639) adopts a different approach and argues against merely political or social
understanding of the idea of power.
Augustine, in some of his works, presents a different systematization of the structure of the human
being (though not one conflicting with the Platonic tripartition). In De Trinitate the fundamental
distinction based on which that structure is further developed is ‘s distinction between an external
and an internal man. In De quantitate animae Augustine presents a seven-leveled developmental
schema of a soul, each time specifying the characteristics of a soul representative of a given level. In
De libero arbitrio the scheme of human cognitive faculties includes the five external senses, an internal
sense (sensus interior) and an intellectual faculty. None of the above mentioned systematizations
conflicts with the Platonic tripartition, which Augustine referred to frequently.
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reflection, with its theological, political and social aspects, that we will focus on
in this paper. We will present an anthropology in which the core of any human
power is the intellect. Power understood in such a way is the main concept used
in Augustine’s writings to describe the process of human motivation. Our analysis
will be synthesized with and compared to Augustine’s theological usage of the idea
of power.  The paper will be completed by a short description of the relevancy of
Augustine’s account of power to subsequent intellectual debates. 
The aim of this paper is therefore twofold. On the one hand the anthropological
aspect of the idea of power in Augustine’s theory is investigated, which allows us
to formulate a number of theses concerning the Augustinian use of the concept of
power. Among these, one – regarding the structure of the act of volition – is of
importance to the discussion of Augustine’s voluntarism.3 On the other hand, we
would like to present the anthropological approach to power, which could be
considered unconventional within contemporary intellectual discourse, that
involves the social or political context of power.4
According to Augustine a human person is a coexistence of three different
elements. Augustine developed his theory of the powers in the human soul in line
with the legacy of Plato’s Republic, in particular, Plato’s idea of the tripartition.5
The Bishop of Hippo claimed the existence of the three parts of the human soul
responsible for the three types of desires that often conflict each other. Where there
is a struggle, power comes into play. As will be argued in this paper, Augustine
described reason as the proper and guiding power of the human mind. Therefore,
he considered reason a necessary condition of every act of will and motivation:
those two could not be understood without an appeal to the concept of reason. 
Reason and Will
We summarise Augustinian consideration of the idea of potestas in its
anthropological dimension (in respect to a man in statu viae)6 into two dominant
understandings. The first is the capacity to influence one’s surroundings and
manifest one’s will in the external world and it is not directly connected to reason.
We argue that this concept of human power is prone to variable limitations,
prominent of which is its dependence on God’s grace. The second use of the idea
of power refers to the deliberative, judgmental, argumentative, estimative and
questioning force of reason (intellectus). However implicit in Augustine’s works,
this understanding of power is a sine qua non of a coherent theory of human action
and his philosophy. Reason is both a driving force of motivation and of will
(voluntas). Voluntas is an intellectual desire that follows the judgement of the
intellect. Moreover, the writings of Augustine, bereft of this anthropological usage
of the idea of power, become very close to determinist or occasionalist standpoints,
which conflict with Christian and Augustinian doctrine. The power of human
intellect constitutes a significant topic of such works as Confessions, On the City
of, On Free Will, On Grace and Free Will, On Nature and Grace, On Reprimand
and Grace, On a Happy Life and On the Holy Trinity.7 We analyse them below in
the presented, non-chronological order. The key to such a sequence lies in the
correlation of the problems discussed in these works.
CONFESSIONES 8
Passages of Confessiones will serve as a detailed illustration of the Augustinian
account of the activity of the will.9 The powerful example of Augustine’s conversion
Augustine, as a Catholic theologian, differentiates between stages of human nature, in particular
between the so-called prelapsarian, postlapsarian and terminal state of human nature. The first of
the three refers to the condition of Adam and Eve before original sin. The second one refers to the
condition of humanity after original sin and before final judgment, while the third refers to the state
of salvation or condemnation after the final judgment. The Latin phrase in statu viae is an expression
naming the postlapsarian perspective, the perspective to which we primarily refer to in this article.
Our general remarks about the anthropological condition pertain to status viae. Only marginally will
we consider the terminal state of glory or condemnation, each time stressing that we do so. For more
on these distinctions see: K. Timpe / A. Jenson: Free Will and Stages of Human Anthropology. In:
Ashgate Companion to Theological Anthropology, ed. by J. Farris / Ch. Taliaferro, Farnham: Ashgate
Publishing Company 2010, and E. Stein: Was is der Mensch? Theologische Anthropologie, Freiburg:
Herder 2005, section I, point D.
All works discussed in the article are available in a Latin on the following website: http://www. au-
gustinus.it/latino/index.htm [11.05.2015]. This source uses the classical edition: Augustinus Aurelius,
Patrologia Latina, vol. 23-47, Paris: J. P. Migne 1844–1855. For a critical edition of Augustine’s
works see: Augustinus Aurelius, Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina, Turnhout: Brepolis, 1953–.
When quoting full sentences of Confessiones in English we will present the translation by E. B. Pusey,
sometimes slightly adjusted. Online source: http://faculty.georgetown.edu/jod/Englishconessions. 
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html [11.05.2015]. All English translations interwoven in the main body of the article are by the
author [JGM].
Confessiones, VIII, 8.
Confessiones, VIII, 8. 
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validates the thesis that it is the power of the intellect that accompanies and shapes
volition. Although the understanding of the intellect as a human power appears
only implicitly in Confessiones, it is still implied by this text. We will analyse
Augustine’s linguistic choices present in his narration, pleading his use of language
supports our thesis of the prevolitional role of the intellect. Our exploration will
first discuss the example and character of Augustine’s conversion and consider the
distinction between acts combining both mental and external activity and purely
mental acts. In particular, we will argue that in the case of purely mental acts, the
rational activity is the power that perfects volition and shapes it into its complete
form. 
It is the famous moment of Augustine’s conversion that offers an in-depth and
up-close insight into how the act of the will is exactly shaped. In the passage of
book VIII of Confessions Augustine elaborates on what must have been merely
minutes or an hour at most in real life. Yet through the magnifying glass of
narration it becomes a complex act which description reveals with utmost scrutiny
the life of thoughts, passions and calls of conscience – all of them combined in
one arduous struggle. Since the thematisation of that moment presents one of the
most detailed accounts of how the act of willing exactly happens, this passage plays
an illustrative role to the more theory-laden writings of Augustine. Whereas the
philosophical or theological analysis merely describes an act of the will with a short
yet adequate word (e.g. voluntas), Confessiones lay out the internal mechanisms of
that act step by step. 
One of the first steps in the struggle of conversion is the recognition of what
are the means of arriving at a conclusive decision.10 The first mean towards this
aim named by Augustine is wanting hard and earnestly (lat. velle fortiter et integre),
which he himself lacks. His state of mind is an internal struggle of a will fighting
itself and thus parted and hurt. The limping will (lat. semisaucia voluntas) is in
part rising to make the decision of becoming a devoted disciple of Christ, and in
a yet another part – is falling down (lat. parte assurgente cum alia parte cadente
luctans). The saint-to-be is thereby far from even the first step on the way to decide.
To partly want and to partly not (lat. partim velle partim nolle) is a sickness of a
torn soul (lat. aegritudo animi) manifesting itself through the appearance of two,
alternative partial volitions, instead of one, complete will (lat. ideo sunt duae
voluntates, quia una earum tota non est). The lack of a complete and full will (lat.
voluntas plena et tota) prevents the soul from action and whatever it partially wishes,
cannot happen.
The next step, following wanting hard and earnestly would be to exercise power
to act accordingly to one’s wishes, i.e. put will into action. Augustine is aware of
Reason and Will
the fact that willing is not always the same as being capable of acting accordingly
to your will. The external conditions, e.g. the weakness of the body, might
dismantle the actualization of an idea. In the case of the soul’s activities, which do
not include the activity of the body, this is not the case however. The limitations
that apply to changing one’s own mind are merely one’s reason. No power to
influence one’s surrounding is required. The only power needed is that of thinking. 
It is because the act of conversion is – especially in Augustine’s case – an
intellectual act, as the passage just mentioned already suggests: Augustine’s first
step was to draw a distinction between means to an end (wanting hard and
earnestly) and an end itself (conversion). Other phases of the conversion described
in Confessions, that cannot be extensively discussed here, allow for the formation
of a conclusive judgment that his conversion is particularly intellectual.11 In other
words, for Augustine, converting means a change of one’s thinking, an intellectual
act concerning one’s conceptual scheme, for instance the eradication of false
assumptions or learning the true ones. It had already started when a nineteen-year-
old Augustine first read Cicero’s Hortensius. Christ’s biblical call “convert!” –
“µετανοεῖτε”12 – stemming from the Greek noun µετάνοια means literally to
change one’s thoughts or to turn one’s thoughts, since it is a combination of the
prefix µετα – after, beyond or over with the noun νόηµα translating into a thought
or an idea. Augustine’s conversion is a literal µετάνοια: getting over one’s ideas. So
will be his faith later on,13 as the following clear formulation shows: ‘Because if
faith is not a matter of thought, it is of no account.14
Let us return to the distinction between purely mental and partially mental and
partially practical acts. As a purely mental act that does not require external
engagement with the world, conversion requires no more than willing. While in
other acts a will needs to be followed up by the power to manifest one’s will in the
external world, the purely mental act requires only volition. Once there is a will
strong enough, there already is a conversion. Strong volition, therefore, equals
having power (lat. potestas) to realize the act in the case of a purely mental activity
of conversion. To put it in short: in faith willing is an action. 
Many commentators judge Augustine’s conversion as such. See e.g. J. A. Weisman: Spirituality and
Mysticism. A Global View, Meryknoll / New York: Orbis Book 2006, pp. 99-104.
Mark 1:15 ‘τοῦ θεοῦ µετανοεῖτε καὶ πιστεύετε’. English translation: “Repent and believe the good
news.” Mattew 4:17 “Ἀπὸ τότε ἤρξατο ὁ Ἰησοῦς κηρύσσειν καὶ λέγειν, Μετανοεῖτε, ἤγγικεν γὰρ
ἡ βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν.” English translation: “From that time on Jesus began to preach and to
say, Repent, for the kingdom of heaven is near.”
For a general exposition of Augustine’s account of the intellectual approach to faith (intellectus fidei),
i.e. intellectual consideration of the teachings of faith, explaining them etc. see: M.
Fiedrowicz:Theologie der Kirchenväter. Grundlagen frühchristlicher Glaubensreflexion, Freiburg / Basel
/ Wien: Herder 2007, section A II d, pp. 35-38.
De Praedestinatione Sanctorum, 5. English translation: On the Predestination of the Saints, trans. by P.
Holmes / R. E. Wallis, online source: http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1512.htm [11.05.2015].
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Confessiones, liber VIII, 10. p. 769: “Nonne diversae voluntates distendunt cor hominis, cum
deliberatur quid potissimum arriiamus.” English translation: ‘Do not diverse wills distract the mind,
while he deliberates which he should rather choose?”
Confessiones, liber VIII, 11: “[…] dicebam enim apud me intus: ecce modo fiat, modo fiat’. English
translation (adjusted by JGM): ‘For I said to myself, Be it done now, be it done now.”
Ibid.: “Sic aegrotabam et excruciabar, accusans memet ipsum solito acerbius nimis, ac volvens et
versans me in vinculo meo[…]’. English translation: ‘Thus soul-sick was I, and tormented, accusing
myself much more severely than my wont, rolling and turning me in my chain […].”
Ibid.: “Ubi vero a fundo arcano alta consideratio traxit et congessit totam miseriam meam in conspectu
cordis mei […]’. English translation: ‘But when a deep consideration had from the secret bottom of
my soul drawn together and heaped up all my misery in the sight of my heart.”
Ibid.: “et audiebam eas iam longe minus quam dimidius, non tamquam libere contradicentes eundo
in obviam, sed velut a dorso mussitantes et discedentem quasi furtim vellicantes, ut respicerem.”
English translation: “And now I much less than half heard them, and not openly showing themselves
and contradicting me, but muttering as it were behind my back, and privily plucking me, as I was
departing, but to look back on them.”
Confessiones, liber VIII, 9.
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Since in this case willing is a complete act and an act of conversion is an
intellectual one, the intellectual character of willing becomes evident. This does
not mean that there is no volition and it is taken over by intellectual activities.
Will does happen, as a grand finale of thinking about why to convert, of
overstepping one’s fears or other emotional restraints, of listening to calls of
conscience, etc. The example of Augustine’s internal struggle of changing his own
will shows, perhaps most explicitly, that it is a power of the intellect that guides a
torn will and perfects a will into an undivided and decisive power. Let us regard
the depiction of this guidance.
The narration mixes verbs describing purely volitional activities, such as to be
attracted to, to be pushed towards, to be torn by or to be repelled from with verbs
naming purely intellectual activity: to consider (lat. deliberare),15 to say to yourself
(lat. dicere),16 to accuse oneself (lat. accusare),17 to think (lat. considerare)18 or to
complain or mutter (lat. mussare).19 Interestingly, at a point of narration the term
‘will’ (lat. voluntas) is used interchangeably by Augustine with the term ‘mind’ (lat.
animus, not anima – soul).20 The term animus undoubtedly brings about the
meaning of a rational rather than volitional power. This suggests that the act of
will, when properly and carefully examined, is accompanied and assisted by the
power of intellect. Eventually, the will overcomes the sickness of partialisation and
reaches the healthy full state through the internal struggle that involves deliberation
as its crucial element. Other accompanying elements are of course feelings or
movements of the heart, imagination and an incomplete wanting. Yet the closer
Augustine gets to the point of turning, the more his narration takes on a form of
thoughts, questions and advice. It is these thoughts, questions and advice that
bring him to the verge of decision, as he himself says: “For I said to myself: Be it
done now, be it done now. And as I spoke, I all but enacted it: I all but did it, and
Reason and Will
did it not […].”21 It is therefore the power of reason that equips a will with what
it needs in order to reach a more complete state. 
The last moments before the Church Father converts consist of acts of intellect
par excellence, that is the calls addressed to God formed as arguments: how long
am I to wait, has it not been enough?22 Those arguments bring him to the point
of full and complete volition, the true wanting that is will and power – that of
reason – at the same time. 
The abovementioned example in which Augustine describes with detailed
scrutiny how the act of the will comes about has clearly a reasonable foundation.
The human person experiencing this act of will is of course a unity, torn perhaps
by passions, imagination, calls of conscience and conflicting wishes, yet a unity in
which reason plays a kingly role. The deliberative power of intellect cures the
sickness of a torn will turning it towards the good that reason has found. As many
years later Augustine will put it: “[…] everybody who believes, thinks – both thinks
in believing and believes in thinking.”23 The inevitable role of intellect is thus a
sine qua non of will and reason may be called the power of willing.
DE CIVITATE DEI 24
The aim of Augustine’s Opus Magnum is to refute pagan argumentation against
Christianity, i.e. to present Christian religion not as a cause of the fall of the Roman
Empire, but rather as its last defense. In this outstanding work Augustine describes
how potestas is not connected with what pagan Romans believed it was: gods and
goddesses, demons, unchangeable fate or heavenly bodies. It is the human intellect,
supported by one true Christian God, which gives the real potestas. As Augustine
explicitly states: “real and secure felicity is the peculiar possession of those who
worship that God by whom alone it can be conferred.”25 God is the beholder of
the ultimate power and the ultimate good. Thus, those who successfully aspire to
Ibid. English trans. has been adjusted. Latin text: “[...] dicebam enim apud me intus: ecce modo
fiat, et cum verbo iam ibam in placitum, iam paene faciebam, et non faciebam.” 
Confessiones, liber VIII, 12: “[…] in hac sententia multa dixi tibi: et tu, Domine, usquequo?
Usquequo, domine, irasceris in finem? Ne memor fueris iniquitatum nostrarum antiquarum.
Sentiebam enim eis me teneri. Iactabam voces miserabiles: quamdiu, quamdiu cras et cras? Quare
non modo? Quare non hac hora finis turpitudinis meae?” English translation: “spake I much unto
Thee: and Thou, O Lord, how long? How long, Lord, wilt Thou be angry for ever? Remember not
our former iniquities, for I felt that I was held by them. I sent up these sorrowful words: How long,
how long, tomorrow, and tomorrow? Why not now? Why not is there this hour an end to my
uncleanness?”
De Praedestinatione Sanctorum, 5. 
On the City of God. 
De civitate Dei, II.23.1. See also ibid., IV.33.
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Ibid. V.9.4.
See: M. F. Burnyeat: The Truth of Tripartition. In: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (2006),
pp. 1-23 for the further discussion.
See: De civitate Dei, XII.6 and XIV.13.
See: ibidem, XIV.21 and XIX.15. See also De correptione et gratia section.
See: De civitiate Dei XIV.13 and XV.7.
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follow God, understood as the highest good possible, attain happiness and
authentic power:
For, as He is the creator of all natures, so also is He the bestower of all powers,
not of all wills; for wicked wills are not from Him, being contrary to nature,
which is from Him. As to bodies, they are more subject to wills: some to our
wills, by which I mean the wills of all living mortal creatures, but more to the
wills of men than of beasts. But all of them are most of all subject to the will
of God, to whom all wills also are subject, since they have no power except
what He has bestowed upon them.26
What exactly is a human power that we receive from God? As mentioned above,
Augustine accepted Plato’s view of a human soul and his theory of the good. In
some of Plato’s dialogues (see: Symposium, Phaedrus, Republic) human actions are
described as always directed towards some good. That is why human potestas is
strictly tied to the process of motivation. Similarly to Plato, Augustine discerns
three types of goods corresponding to the three parts of the human soul and those
parts may be interpreted as the three kinds of motivation (lat. appetitus 27):
appetitive (lat. concupiscibilis), irascible (lat. irascibilis) and rational (lat. rationalis).
The last one, the rational part, is responsible for knowing the general and ultimate
good of a human life.28 As an effect of original sin, the human soul lost its power
over other parts of the soul and its desires.29 That is why Augustine considers
intellect to be the only human power par excellence. The intellect specifies a proper
object of the will, which is the ultimate goal in life and, depending on the power
of a man, directs the will towards either good or evil. 
In De civitate Dei Augustine presents how ill-motivated people lose their power
and begin to err. He argues that the false judgement of an intellect, which he terms
the sin of pride, is the root of original sin.30 False judgements are the result of
improper or bad desire, i.e. a desire formed according to appetitive or irascible
part of the human soul. Such desires disturb the recognition of the ultimate good
and make people turn towards lesser goods. That is why Augustine considered a
conversion to be an intellectual act that changes one’s judgement about what is
good: 
For this all do who follow not God’s will but their own, who live not with an
upright but a crooked heart, and yet offer to God such gifts as they suppose
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will procure from Him that He aid them not by healing but by gratifying their
evil passions. And this is the characteristic of the earthly city, that it worships
God or gods who may aid it in reigning victoriously and peacefully on earth
not through love of doing good, but through lust of rule. The good use the
world that they may enjoy God: the wicked, on the contrary, that they may
enjoy the world would fain use God.31
Augustine argues that desires of lesser goods are the source of impotentia and he
gives two reasons justifying that. Firstly, such desires are opposite to God
(considered as a specific good, the ultimate one): pursuing political power or
sensual pleasures, one may not abide with God. Secondly, they deform one’s
cognition and prevent him from achieving good deeds; moreover, they do not
allow him to love other people, create a City of God, but they rather make him use
friendly relations to attain lesser goods.32 That is why according to Augustine the
real human potestas may be found only in the intellect, since intellect is the only
source of a true judgment concerning what is good and the only faculty of the
human soul that functions autonomously. The latter characteristic of the intellect
as a human power will be described in sections below.
DE LIBERO ARBITRIO 33
This early dialogue presents an explicit use of a concept of power, a use that
narrows it down to its more frequent use in common language.34 It refers mostly
to the human capacity to influence one’s surroundings and manifest one’s will in
the external world. We will consider this understanding and discuss the scope of
human power, in particular, the two dominant limitations of human potestas. This
understanding of power is representative of all works of Augustine in which the
concept of power appears contextually to the history of salvation. 
In particular, the Latin potestas is always present in the discussion of two
consequences of original sin: ignorance and difficulties (lat. ignorantia et
difficultatates), the latter often referred to as a limitation of a power to act. This
De civitate Dei, XV.7.1. See also Confessiones XIII.9.10 and De Trinitate XV.20.38.
See: De civitate Dei XIX.15 and XII.24.3.
When quoting this work in English we use the following translation: On the free choice of the will,
On Grace and Free Choice and Other writings, trans. by P. King, New York: Cambridge University
Press 2010.
For an innovative translation of the Latin title of that dialogue into English and a commentary to
Augustine’s concept of will, see John Rist, Augustine Deformed, p. 80: “the most accurate, though
not the most concise, translation of the title of Augustine’s De libero arbitrio, his three-volume book
on the ‘free decision’ of the ‘will’, would be On the externally uninhibited power to choose which we
have as moral agents: thus seeing our voluntas as the moral character displayed in what we choose
(will) to do and itself formed by what we habitually love and hate.”
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Confessiones, liber VIII: 9. 
De Trinitate, liber VIII: XII, 16.
De correptione et gratia, liber I: XII, 33–34.
De libero arbitrio, liber III: XIX 51–55.
De libero arbitrio, liber I, XIV.29: “Nam credo te memoria tenere quam dixerimus esse bonam
voluntatem: opinor enim, ea dicta est qua recte atque honeste vivere appetimus.” English translation:
“I think you recall how we described the good will, namely as that by which we seek to live rightly
and honorably.”
See section concerning this work below.
De Trinitate, liber XIII, XII.17–XIV.18.
De libero arbitrio, liber III, XIX.53: “[…] et primo erraremus nescientes quid nobis esset faciendum;
deinde ubi nobis inciperent aperiri praecepta iustitiae, vellemus ea facere, et retinente carnalis
concupiscentiae nescio qua necessitate non valeremus?” Augustine judges that as a just punishment.
See De libero arbitrio, liber III, XIX.52: “This penalty for sin is completely just: Someone loses what
he was unwilling to use well, although he could have used it well without trouble had he been willing.
That is, anyone who knowingly does not act rightly thereby loses the knowledge of what is right;
and anyone who was unwilling to act rightly when he could thereby loses the ability when he is
willing.”
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context of original sin’s consequences appears in Confessiones when Augustine
struggling with the limping will asks if that is not the result of Adam’s trespass.35
It is also present in De Trinitate36 as well as in De correptione et gratia37 and De
libero arbitrio.38 In the last remarked dialogue those considerations are preceded
by a reflection on a good will. 
In Book I of De libero arbitrio good will is defined as that which desires right
and an honest life.39 This definition of good will has to be complemented by the
definition of happiness, which remains consistent in many of Augustine’s works,
such as De beata vita liber40 or De Trinitate.41 Happiness is shown as a combination
of two elements – a will towards good and a power to exercise one’s wishes – the
first of which contains the above mentioned account of good will. Those two
conditions – not entirely equal to each other as the formulation placed in De
Trinitate suggests – involve the term potestas and accompany the topic of original
sin. Let us therefore consider Augustine’s formulation of the consequences of the
first trespass. 
Since Adam, whom Augustine treats not as an individual but rather as a
representation of the whole of humanity, failed to act well when he had the power
to do so and knowledge of what he ought to do, the consequences of his choice
are twofold: ignorance and powerlessness. 
First, not knowing what we should do, we fall into error – and then, once the
precepts of justice begin to be revealed to us, we will to do these things but we
cannot, held back by some sort of necessity belonging to carnal lust!42
The power of a human in statu viae, is thus limited and never exactly fitted to our
wishes, even if they are righteous and desire an honest life, as a good will ought to
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wish. For the mark of the original sin wounds our nature and binds us to the
powerlessness that is befitting a creature that ought to learn responsibility over its
free choice. The power of such a creature is lessened in two dimensions:
intellectually, namely in the capacity to recognize the good, and practically, namely
in the capacity to act as we wish.
Another passage of De libero arbitrio is interesting for our investigation.
Augustine wonders together with his prolocutor, Evodius, about beings in this
world that could have some power over a man. In comparison between natural
and voluntary activities Augustine states that when a man turns towards evil
nothing has power over him to force him into evil. Beings greater than a man
would not tempt a man into evil since they are just by their very definition (being
greater than a man), and beings lesser than a man do not have enough power to
force him. As the Bishop of Hippo puts it: 
I believe you recall that in Book I we were in full agreement that the mind
becomes a slave to lust only through its own will: it cannot be forced to this
ugliness by what is higher or by what is equal, since it is unjust; nor by what is
lower, since it is unable.43
A man is thus responsible for his voluntary ill-willed action and no one else is to
be blamed for it. Augustine does however address the issue of man’s responsibility
over things, which do not remain within his powers and he does not hesitate to
admit that one cannot be held responsible for those. 
It is in this early dialogue that Augustine hints at an interrelation between the
concept of power and the concept of will. According to him, we experience power
when we do what we wish to do and for this reason nothing is as much in our
power as our own will.44 This reasoning, when laid out against Christian doctrine
of God’s foreknowledge posses a problem which The Doctor of Grace needs to
face. For how can something remain in our power, being our free choice, if God
knew already beforehand that we will do so? Augustine’s answer rests on the
distinction between causing something and knowing something. To know of
somebody’s future action is not equal to forcing him into performing it, as our
everyday experience might well prove. Otherwise, we would meet a contradiction:
since our willing was forced upon us, how can there be willing at all? Our will
would not be a will at all, if it was not within our power: 
De libero arbitrio, liber III, I.2: “Credo ergo meminisse te, in prima disputatione satis esse compertum,
nulla re fieri mentem servam libidinis, nisi propria voluntate: nam neque a superiore, neque ab
aequali eam posse ad hoc dedecus cogi, quia iniustum est; neque ab inferiore, quia non potest.”
De libero arbitrio, liber III, III.7: “Non enim posses aliud sentire esse in potestate nostra, nisi quod
cum volumus facimus. Quapropter nihil tam in nostra potestate, quam ipsa voluntas est.’ English
translation: ‘You could not perceive anything to be in our power except what we do when we will.
Accordingly, nothing is so much in our power as the will itself.”
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De libero arbitrio, liber III, III.8: “Quod si fieri non potest ut dum volumus non velimus, adest
utique voluntas volentibus; nec aliud quidquam est in potestate, nisi quod volentibus adest. Voluntas
igitur nostra nec voluntas esset, nisi esset in nostra potestate.”
De libero arbitrio, liber III, III.8: “Porro, quia est in potestate, libera est nobis. Non enim est nobis
liberum, quod in potestate non habemus, aut potest non esse quod habemus.”
For example, Augustine reasons in the following way. If God’s foreknowledge is adequate, God
foreknows human choices adequately. An adequate knowledge about human choices is that they are
free choices (De libero arbitrio, liber III, III.8). 
See the section concerning De natura et gratia.
De libero arbitrio, liber III, XIX. 53 and liber III, XX.56–58.
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But if it can happen that we do not will when we will, surely the will is present
in those who will; nor is there anything in our power other than what is present
to those who will. Hence our will would not be a will if it were not in our
power.45
The latter passage argues further: 
Quite the contrary: Since it is in our power, it is free in us. What we do not
have in our power, or what can not be what we have, is not free in us.46.
Augustine’s response to the problem of foreknowledge involves more arguments,
yet for our investigation the most interesting one is the above presented.47 The
quoted formulation ties the concept potestas with the concept of freedom (libertas):
whatever is within our power, is free in us and whatever we do not have power
over, ceases to be within the scope of our freedom. This thesis implies an
understanding of power as that which brings freedom. We should however
remember the close ties between freedom and responsibility as well. The prior
brings the latter – once we are free to choose, we become responsible over the
choice. Thus, potestas brings about responsibility as well.
The angles with which Augustine approaches the concept of power in his most
famous early dialogue De libero arbitrio are therefore various. Firstly, power appears
as the capacity to influence our surroundings when manifesting our will in the
external world. Such power, shows Augustine, is not limitless. The history of
humanity with its grim beginnings creeps up on us in statu viae and our power to
realize both good and bad wishes is constrained by ignorance and the lack of the
capacity to act. True, in the Bishop of Hippo’s teachings, limitations can be
overcome through cooperation with God’s gratuitous gift – grace.48 Moreover,
Augustine differentiates between the inherited guilt for the original sin, for which
individuals are not hold responsible and the individual choices concerning the
consequences of the original sin (e.g. whether one tries to overcome the lack of
knowledge or remains ignorant or whether one fights the difficulties and seeks the
help of grace or he surrenders), for which we are responsible individually.49 Yet the
constrains just mentioned influence our search for happiness, which needs to meet
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the two criteria in order to be realized: good will and the power to live accordingly.
The accent Augustine places on the first factor is nevertheless greater, and if we
only discipline our hearts to wishing the right things, the power should just follow
as an award sent from above. What does that disciplining of the volitional faculty
mean? Assuming we are free subjects, the discipline has to come from within. The
only internal faculty capable of playing that role is reason. In cooperation with
grace, intellect has to first discipline itself to properly recognize the hierarchy of
goods. Then, s with arguments, it has to adhere to will in order to prevent it from
choosing lesser goods above the higher ones. The limited power we have is real
since we are held responsible for our free choices. We are authentically free and
we authentically exercise our power to act, even if we face restraining limitations
that make our power look small or insignificant at times. 
What is important is that the idea of power is tied to the idea of will. It is will
and its use that gives us the experience of power; a will that, as we argue, takes its
driving force from the power of the intellect. 
DE GRATIA ET LIBERO ARBITRIO 50
This response towards the pelagian heresy offers us with a better understanding
of the scope of human powers. The significant aim of this text is the exposition of
the doctrine of grace, the perplexities of which Augustine wished to unravel for
the members of monastic communities. We will consider passages in which
Augustine investigates the influence of God’s grace and confronts it with the
already discussed priority of one condition of happiness over another.51 Those
arguments are relevant to our investigation into the concept of power since they
shed new light on the problem of the limitations of human potestas. The reasoning
will involve two distinctively different uses of the concept of potestas, which should
be contrasted here against each other. 
One – the primary use, as we believe – is that which refers to the power of man’s
intellect, a power that shapes the will of man. Such power is deliberative,
argumentative, questioning, judgmental, estimative, etc. Another understanding
of power appears as the second condition of happiness. As already mentioned, it
names the capacity to influence one’s surroundings.52 Subsequent discussion of
the limitations of power concerns the latter understanding of power and – in a
narrower scope – a faculty of will. 
When quoting this work in English we use the following translation: On the Free Choice of the Will,
On Grace and Free Choice and Other Writings, trans. by P. King, New York: Cambridge University
Press 2010.
That is the priority of the criterion of good will over the criterion of the power to act (not
intellect). For more see the section concerning De libero arbitrio.
It has been presented in the section concerning De libero arbitrio.
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De gratia et libero arbitrio, XV.33: “Ut ergo velimus, sine nobis operatur; cum autem volumus, et sic
volumus, ut faciamus, nobiscum cooperatur.”
See footnote 53.
De gratia et libero arbitrio, XVI.32: “certum est nos velle, cum volumus; sed ille facit ut velimus
bonum.”
The implication that lead Augustine to write De gratia et libero arbitrio and De correptione et gratia
in the first place. For more on the motives that lead to the writing of these works and their similarity
to the reasons for writing Retractationes see: M. Vessey: ‘Opus Imperfectum’ Augustine and His
Readers. In: Vigiliae Christianae 52–3 (1998), pp. 269–270.
De gratia et libero arbitrio, XVII.33: “Quoniam ipse ut velimus operatur incipiens, qui volentibus
cooperatur perficiens.”
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Some passages of De gratia et libero arbitrio give raise to an over-interpretation
of the influence of grace upon men and consequently an over-interpretation of
the limitations of human power. It will therefore be our aim to present a more
balanced and accurate view on that matter.
The human power to act is not a product of man’s own decision or even reason,
rather, it is maintained by God’s grace; the only source of power to act for good.
Man is powerless, and powerless he remains unless he is supported by grace. He
can never produce the power to influence his surroundings ex nihilo – for as we
know, the Babel tower fell and was never to be seen again. By himself a man can
only execute the power to act wrongfully. How does grace exactly maintain and
influence us? Augustine writes: “In order that we will, then, God works without
us; but when we will, and we will in such a way that we act, He works along with
us.”53
Firstly, God’s grace makes the limping, weak will reach its complete form of
wanting the good. Secondly, God’s grace assists men when they start acting for
the good. Grace is therefore a factor pointing out the significant limitations of a
purely human power in statu viae. The human power to act according to good
will is basically a power shared by man and by God.
There is a yet another, more problematic, implication one could draw based on
the above quoted fragment of De gratia et libero arbitrio in respect to human
potestas.54 In some passages the Doctor of Grace seems to suggest it is not just
God’s assistance that points out  our limits, but rather that the very beginning of
every good will is God himself. Let us consider such passage: “It is certain that we
will, when we will. But God brings it about that we will something good.”55
This sentence suggests that God makes us want the good in the first place,
pretty much without our cooperation.56 Some other passages also support this
interpretation: “For He begins by working that we will, which He perfects by
working along with our willing.”57
Once again, these passages imply God as a cause of human good will. It
therefore also implies limitations of human power to act: since it is a will that gives
impulse to execute one’s power to act, and good will originates from God, therefore
also power executed for a good cause requires God as its first cause. Such a
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limitation of both will and acting power seems so restraining one might be tempted
to think there is little to do for a good man himself, if not nothing. This significant
limitation should be disputed however.58 For if we assume that God works in us
not only when we wish to do good yet cannot due to the powerlessness of our
nature, but also before we even start wanting the good, human freedom appears
to be severely limited. Given the interconnection between power, freedom and
responsibility, not only human freedom but also human responsibility and human
rationality appear to be severely limited. A creature deprived of self-constituency
cannot be justly held responsible for the good or evil it was made to want. Such a
creature cannot also be called rational, if it does not desire the good based on its
own intellectual insight into it. All in all, given such an assumption, Christianity
becomes a doctrine of a powerful deity and a creature deprived of the freedom of
will. However, Augustine himself refutes this over-interpretation in the following
passage:  
Now one should not think that free choice has been taken away because the
Apostle said: “God is the one Who works in you both willing and doing works
in conformity with good will” [Phl. 2:13]. If this were so, he would not have
said immediately before that: “Work out your own salvation with fear and
trembling” [Phl. 2:12]. When He bids them to work, this is addressed to their
free choice – but then “with fear and trembling,” so that they not become filled
with pride over their good works, attributing their working well to themselves,
as if their good works were their own.59
Men, we learn, are free and their will is theirs. It is because human will is a
faculty that can be directed by a man towards the good, that a man is obliged by
commandments to do so. He can also be reprimanded, by God or other man,
when he does not do so, in order to be brought back on the right track. Once
Indeed, the Augustinian doctrine of grace was at first misunderstood. The misinterpretation consisted
in a reading that proclaimed an absolute power of grace and at the same time minimalised the role
of human free will. Due to such an understanding some monks considered grace to be so influential
over a man that they saw no reason to reprimand their brothers over their sinful behavior and they
instantly prayed to God instead. De gratia et libero arbitrio and De correptione et gratia were
Augustine’s answer to such misinterpretations (For more on the historical background of the
misunderstanding see: P. King: Introduction. In: On the Free Choice of the Free Will, On Grace and
Free Choice, and Other Writings, p. xvii). 
De gratia et libero arbitrio, IXf.: “Sed quia ipsa bona opera ille in bonis operatur, de quo dictum est:
Deus est enim qui operatur in vobis et velle et operari, pro bona voluntate [Phl. 2:13], ideo dixit
Psalmus: Coronat te in miseratione et misericordia: quia eius miseratione bona operamur, quibus
corona redditur. Non enim, quia dixit: Deus est enim qui operatur in vobis et velle et operari, pro
bona voluntate, ideo liberum arbitrium abstulisse putandus est. Quod si ita esset, non superius
dixisset: Cum timore et tremore vestram ipsorum salutem operamini [Phl. 2:12]. Quando enim
iubetur ut operentur, liberum eorum convenitur arbitrium: sed ideo cum timore et tremore, ne sibi
tribuendo quod bene operantur, de bonis tamquam suis extollantur operibus.” 
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De gratia et libero arbitrio, XV.31: “[…] semper est autem in nobis voluntas libera, sed non semper
est bona. Aut enim a justitia libera est, quando servit peccato, et tunc est mala; aut a peccato libera
est quando servit justitiae, et tunc est bona.”
A final cause in Aristotelian terms i.e. the end, Greek τέλος, distinct from formal, material and
efficient causes.
De libero arbitrio, liber III, III.7.
English translation by P. Holmes and R. E. Wallis: http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1503.htm
[11.05.2015].
See: R. E. Evans: Pelagius: Inquiries and Reappraisals, Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers 2010,
pp. 66–89. 
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equipped with good will, a man should not be boastful however when he achieves
a good deed, since all good actions are achieved in cooperation with God. Men
remain free even if they surpass God’s law, as Augustine reaffirms in the following
passage of De gratia et libero arbitrio: 
The will is always free in us, but it is not always good. For it is either (a) free
from justice, when it is the servant of sin, and then it is evil; or (b) free from
sin, when it is the servant of justice, and then it is good.60
The above regarded passages discard a deterministic interpretation assuming that
God is the efficient cause of a good will. It is rather the human intellect that grasps
the appearance of the good and prompted by the beauty of it and gives rise to a
will towards the good. True, God is responsible for the fact that there is the good
we can intellectually recognise. He is therefore the final cause61 of our aspirations
after good. Yet if anything, it is the intellect and its power that could be called an
efficient cause of the good will. Such initial good will, caused by the intellectual
recognition of the good, is of course man-made and hence weak and humble.
God’s grace is inevitable in order to assist it and perfect it into a form that can be
powerful enough in order to prompt a man to put good wishes into an action and
not fall victim to pride at the same time.
In conclusion let us recall the Doctor of Grace’s theory of grace in his own
words from De libero arbitrio: “nothing is so much in our power as the will itself.”62
DE NATURA ET GRATIA 63
In De natura et gratia Augustine’s main objective is to refute Pelagius and his
doctrine of free will that stressed human autonomy and its capability to avoid sin,
which was based only on the knowledge of the Law of Moses or the doctrine of
Jesus of Nazareth. Pelagius, according to Augustine, perceived will as an
autonomous power enabling the human person to attain salvation on his or her
own. Moreover, he accused Augustine of claiming a too extensive role of God’s
grace upon human actions and therefore, determinism.64 That is why, in his
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treatise, the bishop of Hippo had to develop a strategy of presenting human will
and God’s grace as independent sources of human motivation. He shows therefore
two powers – that of God and that of man – and their specific roles in determining
human action. As described above, Augustine considers human intellect to be the
power presenting objects as good and directing the will to pursue it. 
Why, according to Augustine, do people need God’s grace? First of all, in statu
viae, every human is equipped with a sinful body, which makes our condition “left
half dead on the road, […] being disabled and pierced through with heavy wounds,
which is not able to mount up to the heights of righteousness.”65 People are also
prone to pride, a false self-perception, which causes ‘carnal’ and ‘earthly’ desires.
It means that – as victims of pride – we do not direct our actions according to the
ultimate good, but rather we decide to reject it in favour of such desires as the
thirst for political power, loftiness or even sexual longings, the latter considered
by Augustine to be “animal.” All these non-intellectual desires are the source and
often the cause of false beliefs. All of that leads Augustine to an in-depth analysis
of the role of grace understood as the force involved in motivating human persons
towards the truth and the good: 
there is, however, no method whereby any persons arrive at absolute perfection,
or whereby any man makes the slightest progress to true and godly
righteousness, but the assisting grace of our crucified Saviour Christ, and the
gift of His Spirit.66
Even if one’s intellect would recognize the proper good – God or His ten
commandments – it would not be able to perform the action on its own, unless
with the assistance of God’s grace. God’s grace is, firstly, a source of humility, a
virtue, which does not lead anyone to be “full of pride,” i.e. full of thinking that
one may choose good by “the self-same power.”67 Secondly, God’s grace supports
the practical initiation of the intellectually empowered decision of will. Was, then,
Pelagius right in his critique of Augustine as a determinist?
As presented above, the bishop of Hippo considered actions directed toward
something bad as actions realised without God’s intervention and, in fact, as
manifestations of infirmity or blindness.68 They are the result of a corruption in
the power of the intellect: the corruption of deliberation and judgement. Only
acts considered by Augustine as good are accompanied by God’s grace: for instance
the act of conversion depicted in Confessiones or the act of repentance of a sinner.
That is why “man must pray to be forgiven […], our will alone is not enough to
De natura et gratia 50.43.
Ibidem 70.60.
Ibidem, 38.32.
Ibidem.
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Nam quid stultius quam orare ut facias quod in potestate habeas? Ibidem, 20.18.
De Nat. et Gratia 81.67. See: G. Bonner: Freedom and Necessity. St. Augustine’s Teaching on Divine
Power and Human Freedom, Washington, D.C.:  The Catholic University of America Press 2007,
pp. 82–4. See: also Ph. S. Cary: Inner Grace. Augustine in the Traditions of Plato and Paul, New York:
Oxford University Press 2008.
As it is described in the section of De Trinitate.
When quoting this work in English we use the following translation: On the free choice of the will,
On Grace and Free Choice and Other writings, trans. by P. King, New York: Cambridge University
Press 2010.
A state of a harmed, yet reparable nature. 
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secure its being done.” Augustine clearly sums up: “for what is more foolish than
to pray that you may do that which you have it in your own power to do?”69
Human persons are empowered only to form the right judgement, but the power
of intellect stands unarmed against what is called by Augustine bodily desires. It
is the role of God’s grace to lift us above them: even if the human intellect forms
a proper judgement and a proper will, it still needs help to make it happen:
We pray for help, saying, ‘Lead us not into temptation,’ (Mt 6: 13) and we
should not ask for help if we supposed that the resistance were quite impossible.
It is possible to guard against sin, but by the help of Him who cannot be
deceived. For this very circumstance has much to do with guarding against sin
that we can unfeignedly say, ‘Forgive us our debt, as we forgive our debtors.’
(Mt 6:12) Now there are two ways whereby, even in bodily maladies, the evil
is guarded against—to prevent its occurrence, and, if it happens, to secure a
speedy cure. To prevent its occurrence, we may find precaution in the prayer,
‘Lead us not into temptation;’ to secure the prompt remedy, we have the
resource in the prayer, ‘Forgive us our debts.’ Whether then the danger only
threaten or be inherent, it may be guarded against.70
Augustine was not a determinist if he remained conceived that a human person is
equipped with the power of intellect. Nevertheless, he could not agree with
Pelagius due to, among others, the following reason. This thinker did not accept
the crucial role of God’s grace in overcoming bodily desires and in supporting
one’s humility.71
DE CORREPTIONE ET GRATIA 72
There is however, according to Augustine, a perspective for a man to be set free
from the limitations of the pilgrim’s condition. For status viae is status naturae
lapsae sed reparandae,73 and the reparation is that for which we all should strive.
Once the creeping shadow of original sin is finally overcome, a man lives a life of
complete happiness, filled with both good will and the power to do as he wishes.
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In the text entitled De correptione et gratia Augustine offers us a peak into this
heavenly perspective, a peak that discloses how human power will look in statu
naturae glorificatae.74 This consideration will serve two purposes. The first one is
to complete our investigation into the scope of human powers to act by presenting
both its fullest scope and a possible demise of human capacity to influence the
external world. Our excursion towards status naturae glorificatae involves both uses
of the concept of potestas and thus our second purpose is to show the primary use
of the concept of potestas (as a power of reason) in the context of salvation. The
deliberation of the eschatological perspective of human nature includes this use
and our analysis aims at showing it has a solely positive semantic field. 
The almost dogmatic current Augustinian description of our contemporary
situation confronted with the eternal nature of man is as follows: “to be able not
to sin, and not to be able to sin, to be able not to die, and not to be able to die, to
be able not to abandon the good, and not to be able to abandon good.”75
This clear formulation shows how the scope of human powers is enlarged in
the foreseen eternal perspective. Human potestas is to be capable to not sin and,
apparently, equipped to do so, it is also to be greater than death and, finally, human
potestas is to be capable of not abandoning the good ever again. Surely, it is to be
supported by grace, yet in an unconditional and persistent way – we will not face
the possibility characteristic to status viae of loosing God’s help. Where our first
freedom of will was to be able not to sin, the last freedom of will is to not be able
to sin. Where our first immortality was to be able not to die, the last immortality
is to not be able to die. Where our first persistence was to be able to not part from
the good, the last persistence is to not be able to part from the good. Such scope
of powers is by far the greatest in Augustine’s vision of a man. However glorious,
it is not meant for all people. 
Those who will not be brought to the glory of eternal salvation, will never
overcome the limitations of power of the status viae. On the contrary, they will
face the more restraining, as we might suspect, limitations of the status naturae
damnatorum.76 The limitations will be varied accordingly to the sins of mortals,
suggests Augustine.77 What this exactly means is open for speculation. We may
take on a course of reasoning present in De beata vita liber78 and speculate that to
be powerless when one wishes the wrong things is an advantage, thus the greatest
limitation of man’s nature is to be allowed to perform evil. We can also regard
Augustine’s concept of libido and wonder if evil constraining man’s power does
A state of glorified nature.
De correptione et gratia, XII.33: “[…] posse non peccare, et non posse peccare, posse non mori, et
non posse mori, bonum posse non deserere, et bonum non posse deserere.” (P. King’s translation was
appropriated by authors here).
A forsaken nature.
See: De libero arbitrio, liber III, XXIII.66–68.
See the section concerning that work.
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not consist in desiring that, which we can loose.79 The perplexities of such
speculations exceed Augustine’s reflection however. 
Finally, let us stress that, according to Augustine, to follow the righteous way
and receive salvation is not just an achievement of our own choice and persistence.
De correptione et gratia puts it more clear than elsewhere: free will is sufficient for
evil, yet only partially sufficient for good.80 To enlarge the scope of our powers is
not solely within our own powers. Nevertheless, the eschatological vision of human
potestas is unlimited by temporary limitations of status viae. This eternal perspective
includes the primary understanding of potestas referring to the intellectual power.
In a yet another eschatologically orientated text Augustine points out that Jesus:
[…] when speaking about the gift He was going to give to those who believe,
He did not say ‘This is life eternal, that they might believe…’ but rather: ‘This
is life eternal, that they might know you, the true God, and Jesus Christ, the
one whom You have sent’ [Jn. 17:3].81
It is therefore the intellectual activity that awaits members of the heavenly
Jerusalem. Such correlation of the intellectual activity with the state of salvation
points out the most positive evaluation of that activity in Augustine’s thought. It
is by far not the only one. The opening passages of De libero arbitrio, for instance,
discard the possibility of evil being taught to us by somebody else, for learning is
always something good, as is all intellectual activity.82 Thus, evil can only be going
astray from learning. Reason has an unconditionally positive value for Augustine,
a value unblemished even by heretical arguments it might consider. Without
doubt, the semantic field of all intellectual activity and its power is therefore
positive.
DE BEATA VITA LIBER 83
This orderly dialogue broadens our investigation into the Augustinian account of
happiness, its conditions and, thereby, of power. Apart from naming the two
already mentioned conditions of happiness, the dialogue elaborates on the levels
of happiness that respond to lives that do not meet one of the two conditions. For
De libero arbitrio, liber I, III.6–IV.10.
De correptione et gratia, XI.34: “liberum arbitrium ad malum sufficit, ad bonum autem parum est,
nisi adjuvetur ab omnipotenti bono.” See also De libero arbitrio and De natura et gratia sections.
De libero arbitrio, liber II, II.6: “Sed postea cum de ipso dono loqueretur, quod erat daturus creden-
tibus, non ait, Haec est autem vita aeterna ut credant; sed, Haec est, inquit, vita aeterna, ut cognoscant
te verum Deum, et quem misisti Iesum Christum.”
De libero arbitrio, liber I, I-II.5.
In this section we refer to Latin text only. For the source, see footnote 7.
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Augustine’s account in De beata vita liber is optimistic: a human is able to reach
happiness.84 The exposition of the passage concerning the stratification of
happiness is relevant for our investigation since it presents us with the so far
unobserved pejorative meaning of the concept of power. Subsequently, it allows
us to imply a positive meaning of the concept of powerlessness.
Reflecting on many differently lived lives Augustine wonders how happy they
are. Firstly, he draws a comparison between the two lives which both meet only
one criterion of happiness. Perhaps counter intuitively, the Church Father judges
the life that meets the second condition of happiness – the power to act as one
wishes – and does not meet the first criterion – the good will – to be less happy
than the life that meets the criterion of a good will but fails to meet the condition
of possessing the power to act. We might here be tempted to think that the life
that is least happy and thus most miserable is that which fails to meet both criteria
of happiness. Yet, the life already mentioned – one full of the power to act and
empty of a good will – is in fair competition with the life that does not meet any
criteria of happiness. When laid out against an example of a totally miserable life,
as we suspect, a life with no good will and no power to do the evil it desires, the
ill-willed life with a power to do evil is actually even less happy, concludes
Augustine. It is a lesser misery, he argues, to not achieve what one should not wish
for in the first place, rather than to achieve what should never be an object of good
wishes.85 The questionable honor of the most miserable life belongs therefore to
the life that meets the condition of a power and does not meet the condition of a
good will.
The above-presented formulation offers us with an understanding of power that
has a clear pejorative meaning. Our commentary has focused so far mostly on the
concept of power in the context of good will. The concepts of good will and of
power to do good deeds have a positive character. Once we broaden our
investigation to consider the context of an ill-willed man, we face an understanding
of an idea of power that meets an evident negative evaluation. Subsequently, it is
the powerlessness of an ill-willed man that turns out to be an advantage, unlike a
powerlessness of a good-willed man, whose happiness is less complete without the
power to act. We thereby see that the powerlessness can have both a positive
character – in the case of a life empty of good will, and a negative one – in the
case of a life filled with good will. Human potestas, understood as the capacity to
influence the surroundings, does not have, we can therefore argue, any clear value
in itself. It is the context of human will that can award it with a positive or negative
character. 
De civitate dei poses it as a problem if a man can reach felicity (9.14). For more on Augustine’s chang-
ing optimism towards human happiness see R. Avramenko: The Wound and Salve of Time: Augusti-
ne's Politics of Human Happiness. In: The Review of Metaphysics, 60–4 (2007), pp. 779–811. 
De beata vita liber, II.10: “Nec tam miserum est non adipisci quod velis, quam adipisci velle, quod
non oporteat.’ English translation: ‘Since it is a lesser misery to not achieve what one wills, rather 
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than achieve what one should not will.”
English translation by A. W. Haddan available at: http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1301.htm
[11.05.2015].
De Trinitate XII.3.3
See De civitate Dei and De beata vita liber sections.
Ibid. XII.7.11.
Plautus: Epiducus, 51, ed. by H. T. Riley.
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DE TRINITATE 86
In one of his last and most important treatises Augustine tries to present and
defend the vision of the Trinity as a key idea of Christian doctrine. For this reason
he establishes a theory of knowing God within the Trinitarian view. To answer the
question of how deep human knowledge of the Trinity can be, he develops a
specific usage of the idea of human power, which is the intellect – the only part of
the human soul capable to know the mysteries of the Divine: 
But that of our own which thus has to do with the handling of corporeal and
temporal things, is indeed rational, in that it is not common to us with the
beasts; but it is drawn, as it were, out of that rational substance of our mind,
by which we depend upon and cleave to the intelligible and unchangeable
truth, and which is deputed to handle and direct (lat. tractandis gubernandisque)
the inferior things.87
The ultimate good for Augustine is of course God, the Creator and the source of
all good in the world.88 In De Trinitate the bishop of Hippo shares not only this
Platonic view of the good, but also introduces the Christian idea of a human as
God’s image (lat. imago Dei). Thereby, he states that every human person is
directed towards God by the rational part, the best and the most unique feature
of man as a created entity. That is why the intellect determines the possibilities of
attaining the ultimate good. According to Augustine it is the proper power guiding
other motivational forces of the human soul, which are not able to discern the
good themselves.89 Human reason is empowered to do so, and capable of doing
so, as long as it reflects the nature of its Creator. 
In De Trinitate Augustine confronts a perplexing question: why do people resign
from the proper guidance if they possess such a great tool as the intellect?
Augustine’s answer is told through a reference to an old story about an actor written
by Plautus.90 The actor bets with his audience that he will guess a feature, which
is common to every person listening to him. He eventually wins by saying you will
to buy cheap and sell dear. Augustine’s commentary to this joke is significant:
If the actor had said: You all will to be blessed, you do not will to be wretched; he
would have said something which there is no one that would not recognize in
his own will. For whatever else a man may will secretly, he does not withdraw
Reason and Will
from that will, which is well known to all men, and well known to be in all
men.91
This passage resembles the old Socratic idea that no one wills to do evil.92
Augustine needs such thought in order to introduce the argument of the good (i.e.
the Trinity) as a source of power (potestas) and evil as a source of weakness
(impotentia). It is because unhappy people either do not attain what they try to
get or they do attain it, but in an unruly way. For this reason “he only is a blessed
man, who both has all things, which he wills, and wills nothing ill.”93 If God is
the highest good, then it is the knowledge of Him that makes people happy.94
However, as long as the knowledge of God is not possible in a strict sense,
Augustine tries to present faith (lat. fides) as a proper level of recognition of the
highest good. The presence of desires conflicting with the intellect – a part of
human condition in statu viae – is the reason for human cognitive weakness:95
For by turning itself from the chief good, the mind loses the being a good
mind; but it does not lose the being a mind. And this, too, is a good already,
and one better than the body. The will, therefore, loses that which the will
obtains. For the mind already was, that could wish to be turned to that from
which it was: but that as yet was not, that could wish to be before it was. And
herein is our [supreme] good, when we see whether the thing ought to be or
to have been, respecting which we comprehend that it ought to be or to have
been, and when we see that the thing could not have been unless it ought to
have been, of which we also do not comprehend in what manner it ought to
have been. This good then is not far from every one of us: for in it we live, and
move, and have our being.96
Notwithstanding the fact of the incompleteness of faith, the human intellect is a
source of, and the power to attain, faith by forming proper judgement.97 Faith in
the Trinity, as described by Augustine, is the only way to direct human life towards
55
De Trinitate XIII.3.6: “At si dixisset: Omnes beati esse vultis, miseri esse non vultis; dixisset aliquid
quod nullus in sua non agnosceret voluntate. Quidquid enim aliud quisquam latenter velit, ab hac
voluntate quae omnibus et in omnibus hominibus satis nota est, non recedit.” See: Cicero: Hortensius
and Augustine’s De beata vita liber and De libero arbitrio.
See J. M. Rist, Augustine Deformed. Love, Sin and Freedom in the Western Moral Tradition, New York:
Cambridge University Press 2014, pp. 64–68. See also De civitate Dei and Confessiones sections.
De Trinitate, XII.5.8. See the section concerning De beata vita liber.
See: ibid., XII.7.10.
See: ibid., VIII.2.3.
Ibid., VIII.3.5.
For further discussion see: A. Ployd: Augustine, The Trinity, and the Church, New York, N. Y.: Oxford
University Press 2015, pp. 27–29; R. Williams: Sapientia and the Trinity: Reflections on De Trinitate.
In: Augustiniana 40 (1990), pp. 317–332. 
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If supported by God’s grace. See: the section concerning De natura et gratia.
See: De Trinitate, X.1.3.
Ibid., XII.9.14: “Potestatem quippe suam diligens anima, a communi universo ad privatam partem
prolabitur, et apostatica illa superbia, quod initium peccati dicitur, cum in universitate creaturae Deum
rectorem secuta, legibus eius optime gubernari potuisset, plus aliquid universo appetens, atque id
sua lege gubernare molita, quia nihil est amplius universitate, in curam partilem truditur, et sic aliquid
amplius concupiscendo minuitur, unde et avaritia dicitur radix omnium malorum; totumque illud
ubi aliquid proprium contra leges, quibus universitas administratur, agere nititur, per corpus
proprium gerit, quod partiliter possidet.”
See: Ibidem, XII.12.17.
See the section concerning De natura et gratia.
See: T. Nisula: Augustine and the Functions of Concupiscense, Leiden / Boston: Brill 2012, pp. 35–57. 
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the supreme good that is possible due to the power of the intellect, the faculty
forming specific judgements. 
One’s will and decisions are then made according to the judgment of the
intellect, letting him or her attain the highest good.98 What is important is that
one may not attain it, if he or she does not love it, and one may not love it, if he
does not know it.99 Human intellect is sensitive to losing beliefs or commitments
and Augustine explains this with the concept of pride. 
For the soul loving its own power, slips onwards from the whole which is
common, to a part, which belongs especially to itself. And that apostatizing
pride, which is called “the beginning of sin,” (1 Tim 6, 10) whereas it might
have been most excellently governed by the laws of God, if it had followed
Him as its ruler in the universal creature, by seeking something more than the
whole, and struggling to govern this by a law of its own, is thrust on, since
nothing is more than the whole, into caring for a part; and thus by lusting after
something more, is made less.100
Pride is then an overacted love of power. Augustine is certain which faculty in a
human soul is responsible for this: it is reason, which forms a false judgement
about being powerful enough in order to make oneself happy.101 It is therefore
within human power to make true or false judgements, but it is still beyond human
power to make oneself happy.102 It is so because of the reliance of the will in the
decision making process on reason and other factors, such as God’s grace. 
In book XIII of De Trinitate, where Augustine compares God’s, devil’s and
human capabilities to act he unavoidably refers to the idea of power. Obviously,
God is omnipotent and his powers are limitless. But, the problem of power is
therefore more apparent in the context of devil’s and human’s choice to leave God’s
rule and renounce allegiance to the perfect law. Once again, Augustine turns to
the language of pride, used to explain the reason of ignorance of Satan’s or Eve’s
and Adam’s decision in paradise. According to the Church Father the reason for
bad action is the love of power, because it is based on a false judgments concerning
one’s capabilities and forming unordered desire (cupiditas).103 Augustine points
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here to a paradox of human power which can control one’s judgement through
the activity of the intellect, yet it is the activity of the intellect that forms the proper
will and orders desires:
It is to be wished, then, that power may now be given, but power against vices,
to conquer which men do not wish to be powerful, while they wish to be so in
order to conquer men; and why is this, unless that, being in truth conquered,
they feignedly conquer, and are conquerors not in truth, but in opinion? Let a
man will to be prudent, will to be courageous, will to be temperate, will to be
just; and that he may be able to have these things truly, let him certainly desire
power, and seek to be powerful in himself, and (strange though it be) against himself
for himself. But all the other things which he wills rightly, and yet is not able to
have, as, for instance, immortality and true and full felicity, let him not cease
to long for, and let him patiently expect.104
Despite employing many different metaphors, Augustine’s anthropological vision
offers a consistent theory of human power, proclaiming that to be powerful is to
know and long for the highest good. In De Trinitate he presents three different
dimensions of potestas, which become key ideas in his Trinitarian argumentation
and his vision of the integrity of human motivation, all quite different from the
contemporary vision of human capabilities.105 Augustine’s view of human
motivation is rich and complex, which is why he inspired future debates on the
human soul.106
LEGACY
Indeed, future Christian writers grappled with much of the analysis of power that
Augustine presented. Firstly, Boethius follows in Augustine’s footsteps in his
Consolatio philosphiae 107 stating that the result of every action depends on two
factors: will and power. He strengthened the meaning of the power to act –
Augustine’s second factor contributing to happiness – when he defined the capacity
and 150–190. See also De civitate Dei section.
Ibid., XIII.13.17: “Optandum est itaque ut potestas nunc detur, sed contra vitia, propter quae
vincenda potentes nolunt esse homines, et volunt propter vincendos homines; utquid hoc, nisi ut
vere victi falso vincant, nec sint veritate, sed opinione victores? Velit homo prudens esse, velit fortis,
velit temperans, velit iustus, atque ut haec veraciter possit, potentiam plane optet, atque appetat ut
potens sit in seipso, et miro modo adversus se ipsum pro se ipso. Cetera vero quae bene vult, et tamen
non potest, sicut est immortalitas, et vera ac plena felicitas, desiderare non cesset, et patienter
exspectet.”
See: J. Rist: op. cit., p. 61.
See: ibid., pp. 82f.
Boethius: Consolatio philosophiae, liber IV, prose 2.
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Petrus Damiani: De Divina Omnipotentia, chapters 2–4.
Anselm of Canterbury: De libertate arbitrii, for the concept of power see in particular: chapters If.,
V–VII, IX–XIV.
For example God’s omnipotence versus the lack of the capacity to sin: Proslogion, chapter VII; for
power in an eschatological dimension: De casu diaboli, chapters VIIf., XII–XIV, XV–XXVIII; Cur
Deus homo, cap. XVII.
Petrus Abaelardus: Sic et non, 29–38; Theologia Summi Boni, liber V.
Pseudo-Abelard: Epitome christianae philosophiae, also refer to as Sententiae Hermanni, cap.  VIII,
XIX–XXII, XXVf.
Hugh of Saint Victor: De sacramentis christianae fidei, liber I, pars 2, cap. 5–10, liber I, pars 4, cap.1–
25; Richard of Saint Victor: De tribus appropriatis personis in Trinitate.
That is, during the so-called middle ages, as the somewhat unfavorable later-coined term phrases it.
Augustine’s influence on Jansenists, J. B. Bossuet or N. Malebranche shows his legacy remained
significant even longer.
M. Foucault: op.cit., p. 788.
P. Morriss: Power: A Philosophical Analysis, Manchester: Manchester University Press 2 2002;  see also
D. Béland, op. cit. 
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to do evil as a lack of power. He therefore concluded that a good man is powerful
enough to achieve everything, and a wretched man is powerless. Peter Damian in
his extensive letter on God’s power, De Divina Omnipotentia,108 considered an
interrelation of the concepts of power and will, regarded in Augustine’s thinking
already six centuries earlier. Anselm of Canterbury entitled his study of the free
will with a phrase inspired by the Doctor of Grace’s early dialogue109 and included
problems raised by Augustine in his own philosophy.110 Peter Abelard did not
ignore issues stemming from the Bishop of Hippo’s writings,111 nor did the author
of a work primarily ascribed to Abelard, the so-called Pseudo-Abelard.112 Finally,
Hugo and Richard of Saint Victor recognized the relevance of Augustine’s legacy
for their own thinking about potestas.113 Augustine’s original and extensive research
concerning different dimensions of the idea of power: anthropological, theological
and political, remained influential in the Catholic culture of the subsequent ten
centuries.114 Yet – the history of thought has demonstrated to be selective in the
long run and our contemporary debates remain bereft of some of the riches of the
idea of power that Augustine first brought to light. 
Contemporary intellectual debate is focused mostly on the political aspect of
the idea of power: “power exists only when it is put into action, even if, of course,
it is integrated into a disparate field of possibilities brought to bear upon
permanent structures”115 – we read for  example in Foucault’s The Subject and
Power. His diagnosis is that there is no power not applied into or not connected
with the social structure. Even Morris’ distinction116 between a “power over” and
a “power to” is restricted to a political meaning. As we tried to show, Augustine,
on the other hand, followed the classical philosophical idea of finding the social
within the individual. Thanks to such an approach he was able to describe not
only the social relations, but also the God-man relation, as well as that of the inner
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soul, and to analyse them in terms of potestas. The idea of the power of the intellect
was crucial in his philosophy and for that reason his followers created an important
philosophical tradition known nowadays as intellectualism. Augustine’s
achievement is reflected in many ancient and medieval intellectual debates, yet it
seems nevertheless to be largely lost in the contemporary discussion of today. 
CONCLUSION
The manifold understandings of the Augustinian idea of power discussed above,
took account of its theological, political and – particularly – its anthropological
dimensions. The idea of power in Augustine’s anthropological thinking points in
two major directions. Firstly, we have argued that the in-depth consideration of
the illustrative example of his conversion, presented in the Confessiones, brings to
light the intellectual, assistive power of reason that shapes volition and guides it
into a complete and decisive form. Our confrontation with the theory of grace
and its deterministic misinterpretation allows us to form a thesis that it is the
power of the intellect with its insights concerning the good that gives rise to the
initial form of the will. Both of those points are relevant in the discussion over
Augustine’s voluntarism, for they pose the question whether it is the will that arises
first and plays first and final role in the decision-making process. Certainly,
Augustinian voluntarism does not consist in valuing will above intellect, as
commentators have frequently observed.117 In the axiological order, the higher
rank is that of the intellect, as the bishop of Hippo clearly stated himself.118 It is
the capability of volition to disregard the intellectual power of a man that discloses
the core of voluntarism. Our considerations aim at showing that the intellect is
the only power that can bring a toddling volition to its mature and thus decisive
form and it is also the only power, which awakens the appetitive drive of the will
towards the good. Whether volition can be still regarded as the only righteous
candidate to the throne in the powerful kingdom of the human soul, remains
disputable then.
The second understanding of the idea of power, which refers to the capacity to
shape the surroundings according to one’s will, has been analysed in respect to the
scope of human potestas and its axiological character. Limitations of the human
power to act are frequently correlated by Augustine to the postlapsarian nature of
man and can be overcome through the support of God’s grace. When the
distinctively human limitations are surpassed in cooperation with grace, the power
to act becomes less limited, but at the same time it also becomes a human and
For instance, in the Polish debate: J. Domański: O wolnej woli. In: Augustyn, Dialogi filozoficzne,
ed. by J. Domański, Warszawa: Pax 1953, vol. 3, pp. 71–76.
For instance, De libero arbitrio, liber I, I.3.
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Godly power at the same time. The elaborations regarding the axiological character
of human power lead to a conclusion that it is neutral. Undoubtedly, the power
to act can contribute both to human misery as well as to happiness, as can human
powerlessness. This axiological ambiguousness of the power to act points to the
primary understanding of the concept of potestas, namely, reason understood as
that which can contribute to the valuable usage of any power. It is reason that
guides human power to a good cause, and without reason power can only lead
into the wretchedness of an irrationally driven existence. The interrelation of
human freedom, power and responsibility confronts us thus with the ancient, yet
still relevant call: never abandon that which empowers you most.119
